Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts

Tuesday 17 December 2019

Comments on IMF Working Paper on Estimating the Size of Shadow Economy in Europe



This post is a continuation of a series of the difficulties of modelling illicit financial activity and the need to understand that the results of such models are estimates not facts when we use those results.


On 13 Dec 2019 the IMF published Working Paper 19/278 Explaining the Shadow Economy in Europe: Size, Causes and Policy Options written by B. Kelmanson, K. Kirabaeva, L. Medina, B. Mircheva and J. Weiss.

Before discussing this publication, just a note that IMF WPs do not represent the IMF’s official position, but report on research in progress and are designed to elicit comment and feedback.

While the WP is “rich” in content, I’d like to highlight a few points for comment. Because as usual AA has an axe to grind.

Defining and Measuring the “Shadow Economy”  (Pages 5-6)

There are several key take-ways here.
  1. Different Definitions - There are different definitions of the “shadow economy”.  And so, it’s important to know which definition is being used in an estimate.  It’s like Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  Are we measuring all corruption in a country or just a subset?
  2. Estimates Not Measurement - What is actually going on is not measurement in a formal sense.  But an attempt to estimate the size. A critical difference.  One can directly measure AA’s weight.  Or the distance from Bayt Meri to Beirut. But one can’t directly measure this or that person’s intelligence.  One has to estimate it.
  3. There is No Single Infallible Method for Such Estimations – in the authors’ words “There is no ideal or leading method to measure the shadow economy, each of them have some conceptual or practical strengths and weaknesses. The choice of the methodology can be governed by data availability, or the research objectives. Multiple methods can be employed to improve accuracy of the estimations.”
  4. Each Model has its Limitations - In discussing the model they used (MIMIC), the authors state: “The shortcomings of this method include sensitivity to changes in data and specifications, the sample used, calibration procedures, and starting values (Breusch 2005).”
Results – False Precision
  1. The tables of results are on page 25 and 26.
  2. The results appear very precise.
  3. The authors have come up with results to the tenth of one percent.  Or in non percentage terms .001.  That is some pretty fine parsing for estimates of the size of something that is unknown.
  4. Not only that but they have been able to order the sizes of the shadow economies among various countries.
  5. In the first table (page 25), France is 15.3% while in Germany is at  15.9%.  In the second table, the scores are 15.0% and 16.7% respectively.
  6. Is this precision really possible?
  7. What about the caveats about models and estimates in the previous section?
  8. Shouldn’t we expect to see less precision?
  9. Use of ranges?  Grouping of countries into similar baskets.  For example, Germany and France have roughly the same size shadow economies.
  10. AA has his axe out now. I made the argument in an earlier post on Transparency International’s CPI that when valuing the credit worthiness of an issuer rating agencies place similar firms in broad categories, AAA, AA, A etc.  They don’t parse creditworthiness of individual firms within a category. And since I have a habit of repeating myself made the same arguments in another post about modelling illicit financial flows.
  11. Similarly in valuing firms, stock analysts come up with a range for the value of stock, not a single point estimate.
  12. The point I want to make yet again is that we need to treat results from such modelling efforts as directional not locational. They are not precise but only give an indication of the real state of affairs. And when we use them, we need to keep that in mind.
Implications: Likely Underreporting of “Total” GDP

Ignoring the shadow economy means that we are likely underreporting the total or “true” GDP of a country – that is the GDP from its formal sector and that from its informal or shadow sector.  

Where the shadow economy is relatively small, this probably doesn't make much of a difference. 

But if the authors’ estimates that the shadow economy in the CIS countries is around 40% of formal GDP (page 7) are correct, then typical characterizations of CIS “dismal” economic performance based on only formal GDP are probably less true than they appear.

This does not of course “excuse” the fact that a good portion of this activity is taking place “off the books”.   

Wednesday 6 November 2019

IMF FSAP Technical Note on the AML/CFT Regime in France

More than just Tracfin Covered by FSAP

Last week the IMF released its Technical Note- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regime in France undertaken as part of the 2019 FSAP for France.

What’s a FSAP? All you’re likely to want to know courtesy of the IMF.

There are many interesting points in this publication.

  1. An analysis of the current state of France’s AML/CTF regime.

  2. Identification of areas for improvement. An interesting topic as we mostly focus on non OECD jurisdictions' shortcomings and recommendations for improvement.

  3. Statistics related to inspection and enforcement (Tables 2 through 7 on page 3.  AA found these and the accompanying discussions the most interesting.  Regulations are one thing. They provide the basis for action. But inspections and enforcement measures are clearly more important in assessing actual implementation.

Some further thoughts and observations.

First, it's important to understand that banks have an incentive to file STRs.  One of the best defenses against enforcement actions is to demonstrate that one’s institution has a robust AML/TF system.

If a bank files no STRs and one of its customers is found to be a money launderer or terrorist financier, it has less of an argument than if it has filed 100 reports.

So increases in STRs are not necessarily related to increased illegal activity.  Note the “not necessarily” caveat.

Second, those seeking to conduct illicit financial transactions will look for weak points, e.g., industries and geographies not inspected by the relevant bodies. You can see some familiar industries mentioned here where increased efforts are recommended.

France’s Overseas Territories (Table 2) may be such a geographical vulnerability.

That being said, it should be fairly easy for regulators to spot individual financial transactions or aggregate flows of transactions which exceed normal economic activity.

In analyzing RMB flows in Africa attributed by SWIFT RMB Tracker to the Republic of South Africa three years ago  it didn’t take AA very long to find easily available information that indicated that it was highly likely that a good portion of these transactions were from other African countries not just the RSA alone.

AA also identified an outsize RMB transaction in Mauritius which didn’t seem to fit normal commercial activity.  And AA does not have access to the information that national regulators have, some of which is acquired through clandestine means.

That being said, for some unknown reason, massive transaction flows through the branch of a Danish bank is Estonia flew under the radar both at the bank’s HO and at regulators in both Estonia and Denmark.

On very good authority it is said, “There is always enough light for one who wishes to see”.  هناك دائما ما يكفي من الضوء لمن يرغب في رؤية

Monday 10 June 2019

Qatar: Doing Quite Nicely Thank You

The Lights are Still On 

So how is Qatar faring in the face of the Quartet’s boycott?  

Of course, not everything is perfect but as the 2019 IMF Article IV consultation with Qatar demonstrates the country is coping and in some areas doing quite well.

From this point on what follows are a series of direct quotes from the IMF. 

On May 13, 2019, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Qatar and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.  

Economic performance improved in 2018. Qatar’s economy has successfully absorbed the shocks from the 2014–16 drop in hydrocarbon prices and the 2017 diplomatic rift. Real GDP growth is estimated at 2.2 percent, up from 1.6 percent in 2017. Headline inflation remained low.  The central government’s fiscal position switched to a surplus of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2018 from a sizable deficit in 2017. Recovery in non-resident deposits and foreign bank funding helped banks increase private sector credit. Banks have been able to diversify the geographical composition of non-resident deposits. The current account is estimated to have reached a surplus of 9.3 percent of GDP in 2018, largely reflecting higher average oil prices. Reserves reached US$31 billion (5½ months of imports) at end-December 2018. Recently, Qatar issued US$12 billion in international bonds, which was more than four times oversubscribed, with lower spreads than in previous issues.

Qatar’s banking sector remains healthy, reflecting high asset quality and strong capitalization. At end-September 2018, banks had high capitalization (CAR of 16 percent) and maintained strong profitability (ROA of 1.6 percent), low non-performing loans (ratio of 1.7 percent), and a reasonable provisioning ratio of 83 percent. Banks are comfortably liquid, with a liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio of 29.7 percent. Nonetheless, strong credit growth that outpaced deposits resulted in the system-wide loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio of 103 percent which is higher than the CB’s guidance of 100 percent. After a period of rapid growth, real estate prices in Qatar are adjusting to new levels. According to the real estate price index developed by QCB, following an 82 percent increase during 2012–16, real estate prices fell by 15 percent during 2017–18. Macro-financial prospects remain favorable, though risks skew to the downside.   

The external position is weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and medium-term policy settings. (Annex II). Nonetheless, with gradual fiscal adjustment, the estimated current account gap could be closed in the medium term. While reserves are low relative to the ARA metric, risks are mitigated by large sovereign wealth fund assets (Annex II) and external debt is assessed to be sustainable (Annex III). The peg to the U.S. dollar continues to provide a clear and credible monetary anchor and is considered to be sustainable 

Stress test results indicate that Qatari banks can withstand severe macroeconomic shocks. Given the strong position of the financial system, with low NPLs, adequate provisioning, and solid profitability, banks can comfortably withstand higher NPLs and lower profitability brought about by macroeconomic shocks (see IMF Country Report No. 18/136). Many of the real estate borrowers are reportedly well-diversified large conglomerates that are able to support their loan payments from other businesses.

The recovery in non-resident deposits (by 23 percent y-o-y by December 2018) and foreign bank funding (up by 23 percent) helped banks increase private sector credit by 13 percent y-o-y by December 2018.5 Banks have been able to diversify the geographical composition of non-resident deposits and lengthened their maturity structure.  

The stock market performed well in 2018, with the index recovering its 2017 losses and rising by 23 percent in 2018. Bond yields declined reflecting positive investor sentiment towards Qatar.  

Thursday 13 July 2017

IMF Managing Director Less Sanguine About Financial Stability Than Federal Reserve Chairwoman



As per CNBC, The International Monetary Fund's Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, has said that she would not rule out another financial crisis in her lifetime, indicating that comments made recently by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen may have been premature.

"I plan on having a long life and I hope she (Yellen) does, too, so I wouldn't absolutely bet on that because there are cycles that we have seen over the past decade and I wouldn't exclude that," Lagarde said.

In this debate AA's money is on CMOL.  Hope yours is too.

Tip of AA's tarbush to CNBC for the phrase "may have been premature".

Previous post on Ms. Yellen here.

Wednesday 23 November 2016

AMF Study: Bank De-Risking in the Arab Region -- Big Deal or Not?

AA: As Usual on Top of the Story.  It Looks a Lot Scarier Up Here. 


In an earlier post I outlined why the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's appeals to its banks to "manage correspondent risks" rather than "de-risk" were likely to fall on deaf ears.

Today I’d like to continue exploration of that topic by looking at September 2016 Arab Monetary Fund/IMF/IBRD study Withdrawal of Correspondent Banking Relationships (CBRs) in the Arab Region”.

Context – Survey Coverage
The report is based on a survey of 216 banks in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, KSA, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.  One country was excluded from “some analysis” as it is “perceived as a high risk area”. AA is guessing Yemen, though it is not the only “high risk” name in the list.   
  
Details

Apparent Modest Impact
  1. 55% of the banks surveyed did not experience any problems with closure of CBRS.  1% did not respond. 5% reported an increase in CBRs. 
  2. Only 39% (84 out of 216 banks) had CBRs terminated. 
  3. Of this latter group roughly 63% (53 banks) found replacement CBRs, and another 17% (14 banks) developed “workarounds”.  Perhaps an indication that all correspondents are not de-risking?
  4. Only 20% (17 banks or 8% of the 216 banks surveyed) did not find a solution.   
On this basis, it doesn’t seem that de-risking in MENA is a major problem at least at the macro level.

Two caveats.   

First, “limitations” in the survey (see below) preclude making a definitive assessment on impact as well as on the motive(s) for de-risking.  

Second, the number of accounts closed increased over the survey period 2012-2015 (Figure 5), indicating that affected banks are increasingly being disconnected from international finance.         

Primary De-Risking Banks

As expected US banks were the main de-riskers followed by the UK and Germany. Interestingly of the ten countries’ banks named as de-riskers, banks in Saudi were in 4th place and the UAE in 8th place AED and SAR accounts were closed. It’s not clear from the survey if the UAE and Saudi banks are solely responsible for the closures. 

It doesn't seem unreasonable to assume that they were at least partially responsible. If so, an intriguing but unanswered question.  Were their actions motivated by these banks’ own concerns or local regulations? Or are they defensive measures to prevent their foreign correspondents from “de-risking” them?

Survey “Limitations”

As outlined below, these limitations lessen the survey’s utility. Presumably some of this reflects a conscious decision to avoid creating a knock-on effect and potentially worsening the situation by providing too much public information.

Now to the limitations.

The size and location of the affected banks is not disclosed.  If major banks are being de-risked, the impact is likely to be greater than if smaller banks are.  If the de-risking is focused on one or two countries, then what appears to be manageable problem is not –at least for the affected countries.

It’s highly likely that correspondents did not provide a concrete reason for terminating a CBR. But rather used such words as “strategic review of our business”, “change in focus”. If you ever have had to let people go or were on the receiving end yourself, you know that these events are couched in euphemisms like “downsizing”. One doesn’t fire an employee.  Rather his or her position is “eliminated”.  Nothing personal there at all.  We’d love to have you but we don’t have a “position” for you.  The same with closure of accounts. 

If the reason for the firing or closure of an account is not directly “personal” or concrete, it’s hard for the affected party to mount an objection.  How do you argue your case?  Do you really expect the institution to change its board-approved strategy so you get to retain your job or account?    
  
To get around this likely scenario, survey respondents were asked to ascribe motives to the termination of CBRs.  The survey provides 16 possible “drivers” of the decision to terminate CBRs.  Respondents were free to select more than one and were asked to rank them from 1 to 16--which AA takes as an invitation to rank all of them.  Thankfully not every respondent did.  There were some 234 votes from the 84 banks.  Only 17% of the maximum possible number of responses.
  
There are two problems though.   

First, respondents are not only being asked to read their correspondents’ minds, but also to do so with a high degree of precision.

Second, many of the drivers are similar.  One might well need an electron microscope to parse these in any practical sense.  This compounds the dubious first assumption of mind reading skills.

Some examples of similar/duplicative motives.  Note the numbering below follows the rankings on pages 11-12 in the report.
  
  1. Driver 1 (overall risk appetite) seems to include Driver 4 (change in sovereign risk rating).  As to 4, if indeed it is an accurate assessment, then shouldn’t all banks in Country X be affected more or less at least by the same correspondent? Thus, one would find that all or most banks in Country X had their CBRs terminated.   If that’s not the case (and the AMF has the data), then this Driver should be excluded.    
  2. There are 10 Drivers related to regulatory reasons. Drivers 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16 overlap to a large extent on AML/CFT, though those aren’t the only regulatory issues mentioned. It boggles AA’s mind that the survey constructor thought that participants would be able to provide such granular assessments of what their correspondents’ motives were.      
Third, it also seems (note that caveat) that in ranking drivers no adjustment was made for this overlap.   The summary puts AML/CFT in fifth place.  This seems based Driver 5 being in fifth place by number of “votes” while ignoring the votes for all the other AML/CFT related drivers. 
  
I think it would have been better to have a few very broad primary motives, e.g., credit, profitability, regulatory, refusal/failure to provide requested information.  Participants could have then been asked to ascribe a percentage to each.  This more limited menu probably would be not only easier but more appropriate given the inherent limitations of mind reading. 
  
Follow-up questions could have been used to attempt to parse sub-drivers with economy in options.  For example, was refusal/failure to provide requested information due to regulatory impediments (bank secrecy) or internal bank decision?  Were regulatory concerns focused on AML/CFT, sanctions, or other (e.g. FACTA)? 

Interestingly Driver 16 and part of Driver 8 consist of failures by the respondent bank to provide sufficient AML information, in which case one might argue that the correspondent was obliged by regulation to terminate the CBR or decided failure indicated not only bad faith but probable bad behavior.    The same with Driver 15 imposition of sanctions.  DPAs would be another example.

This is an important point.  If the correspondent is "forced" to withdraw services, this is not "de-risking" but compliance. Focusing a question on this issue would be most helpful.  

The survey noted that banks that found replacement CBRs or developed workarounds faced increased costs, but no data is provided on the relative increase in costs.

All this being said there is useful information in the study. 

Hopefully, it will serve as a basis for further examination of this issue with perhaps answers to some of the above open items as well as a fine tuning of questions.


There's an Occasion Every Day!

One quibble.  There’s always at least one and usually more with AA.
1.3 Hence, the “de-risking” phenomenon involves financial institutions’ practices of terminating or restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid rather than manage risks. It is a misconception to characterize “de-risking” exclusively as an anti-money laundering/ combatting terrorism financing issue. In fact, “de-risking” can be the result of various drivers, such as concerns about profitability, prudential requirements, anxiety after the global financial crisis, and reputational risk.
  
The AMF is right to indicate that the motives for “de-risking” don’t relate solely to AML/CFT.  Sanctions and other regulations are important as well.

I’d argue that termination of unprofitable relationships is not “de-risking” nor is restructuring/eliminating lines of business to meet prudential regulations (increases in capital charges).  That’s simply common business sense.  If one can’t make a profit selling a good or providing a service, one stops doing so if there is no way to increase pricing or lower costs sufficiently. 

No doubt many of the small CBRs being tossed do not meet internal ROA targets and would require massive increases in pricing to do so.  At some point too banks like any business need to focus on key LOBs and customers.  “80% of the revenue comes from …”  If you've been around long enough, you know the last bit to that sentence and the business strategy it supports.  "Dabbling" or "hobbies" (my mentor’s descriptive terms) divert resources and attention from more profitable customers and LOBs.

Also it’s not clear to me how anxiety is playing a role.

Clearly any regulatory/prudential anxiety is already covered by those topics. 

If there are concerns about credit quality, then measures theoretically could be put in place to cover these.  Pay against receipt of funds only (no overdrafts), require cash collateral for residual risks (check deposits bouncing, for example), and increase pricing for the additional special handling required. 

But, if a relationship is marginally profitable, what's the point of all of this when the time and effort might be spent on other customers or LOBs where real money could be made?  And when 100% of the risks are unlikely to be covered despite all the elaborate risk management? 

But let's assume a correspondent exerts the effort. At this point, “risk management” might result in making an offer that can’t be accepted, equivalent to withdrawal of CBR. No doubt sparking the argument that “risk management” of this sort was really disguised “de-risking”.    

Monday 4 October 2010

IMF Working Paper: Recent Credit Stagnation in MENA


The IMF has released a Working Paper on credit stagnation in MENA prepared by four staff members, though it should be noted that IMF WP's do not represent official views of the IMF.

The report provides some interesting statistics on credit growth compared to measure of "normal" credit growth and some decomposition of changes in bank balance sheets post crisis.

I didn't see anything particularly controversial in the findings.  Or findings that would challenge intuitive analysis.  

The country by country data does provide a context for viewing credit growth across the region.

Thursday 5 August 2010

Kuwait FSSA: Snapshot of Banking Sector



You probably have seen articles mentioning some of the criticisms and recommendations contained in the IMF's recent update of its Financial Sector Stability Assessment for Kuwait.

While I hope to review those in following posts in the not too distant future, I'd like to start by drawing on some of the material to give a macro picture of the Kuwaiti commercial banking sector – both conventional and Shari'ah compliant. This will complement the earlier post on other economic sectors in the country based on Al Joman's analysis.

Let's begin with a look at some macro numbers on the sector. These are taken from Table 5 Page 19. And these are only a few of the statistics there.

Banks' asset composition (Central Bank of Kuwait and IMF estimates). Amounts below are percentages.

Category06070809
Trade 11.610.1  9.8  8.8
Industry   4.3  5.4  6.2   5.8
Real Estate & Construction 28.730.631.332.2
Agriculture & Fishing   0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
Investment Companies   8.811.710.911.1
Oil &Gas   0.6  0.4  0.6  1.0
Public Services   0.7  0.4  0.1  0.1
Consumer – Credit Cards   1.5  1.2  0.8  0.6
Consumer –Auto   4.0  2.6  2.2  2.0
Consumer – Consumer Loans 19.917.015.216.4
Consumer – Mortgages   3.5  2.7  2.5  2.2
Consumer – Equity Purchase Loans 10.310.111.110.5
Other   5.8  7.6  9.2  9.1
 
Some observations. 
  1. There is significant exposure to Real Estate/Construction, Investment Companies, and Consumer Loans for Share Purchases. Almost 54%.   One might describe these as not primarily productive sectors but derivative sectors feeding off wealth created by other sectors. 
  2. By contrast there is relatively little lending to what are usually considered primary productive sectors:  manufacturing, farming and trading sectors.  That reflects lending opportunities by and large rather than lender red lining.
  3. Consumer lending is a significant LOB at 39.2%, 33.6%, 31.8% and 31.8%. 
  4. Lending for share purchases is 10%+. A particularly tricky business to engage in given the volatility in the KSE and lack of proper supervision/regulation. 
  5. Consumer loans are another major segment. In the words of the FSSA "low risks loans since they are guaranteed by salary assignments". This is a mantra you will just about every commercial banker in the Gulf mention. What they don't mention is that at many lenders there are no maximum loan to salary ratios – designed to make sure borrowers have a serviceable debt burden. A reason why the Central Bank of Bahrain established these in a regulation. Or that if a person loses his job (something happening a bit more frequently these days), there is no salary to assign. And what are we to make of agitation in the Majlis Al Umma for the Government to buy up consumer debt, if everything is fine?
Some additional metrics, again percentages.


Category06070809
NPLs to Total Loans    3.9    3.2    5.3    9.7
NPLs Net of Provisions to Capital  14.3  11.4 26.0  45.7
Large Exposure to Tier I Capital144.0129.8129.5144.9
ROAA    3.7    3.6    0.9    0.8
ROAE  28.8  29.4    7.7    6.8
Equity Exposure to Shareholders' Equity  53.2  56.9  67.6  68.5

 

More observations. 
  1. I think the trends are what are more important. Clearly, the direction of these ratios is not surprising given knowledge of the difficulties faced by the banking sector over the past few years. 
  2. The second ratio's dramatic increase is due to an almost doubling of NPLs between 2008 and 2009. There was an equally dramatic drop in provision coverage from 124% in 2007 to 89.4% in 2008 and 68.3% in 2009. 
  3. Also note that the last ratio reflects (a) lending for equity purchases and (b) equity taken as collateral for other extensions of credit.
Let's look at the FSSA's comments.
  1. In its Risk Assessment Matrix, the IMF notes concentrations in exposure to real estate, investment companies and stock prices, commenting that a decline in real estate or stock prices could lead to a major increase in Non Performing Loans ("NPLs"). 
  2. It also notes Kuwaiti banks have minimal sovereign risk exposure. 
  3. Reasonably good liquidity with liquid assets at 26% of total assets. 
  4. Banks' assets predominantly domestic – some 80%. And I'd guess international exposure may be primarily with NBK. 
  5. Loan to deposit ratio under 100% at 91% in 2009. 
  6. In terms of assessing a severe realisation of a threat sometimes in the next three years, it assigns a medium risk of occurrence (PD) and medium loss (LGD). 
  7. Banks could broadly withstand IMF's stress tests (outlined in Appendix IV Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Referring to the stress tests there were three: a base case, an intermediate case and a severe case.  And the test was for yeat 2010.
  1. Baseline Case:  All 10 banks have Capital Adequacy over 12%.  No problems with liquidity.
  2. Scenario 1(Intermediate):   1 bank has capital less than 8%, 4 between 8% and 12% and 5 over 12%.  Of the Top 5 banks, 3 are in 8 to 12% category and 2 above 12%.  No liquidity problems.  Recapitalization of banks below 12% threshold requires 1% of GDP.
  3. Scenario 2 (Severe):  1 medium size bank loses all its capital, 4 banks are below 8% but above 0%, 2 banks in the 8% to 12% range, and 3 banks above 12%.  Of the Top 5 Banks, 3 are in the 0% to 8% range, 1 in the 8% to 12% range, and 1 bank only exceeds 12%.  (Presumably Abu Shukri).  No liquidity problems.  Recap amount here is 3.8% of GDP.